Asia Intelligence Update: http//www.stratfor.com/aiu/aiu_info.html Global Intelligence Update, Red Alert, November 11, 1998
Anti-Saddam Coalition Builds, While Military Options Remain Inadequate

Amid much conjecture about military action against Iraq, following Baghdad's suspension of UNSCOM monitoring, a key U.S. ally in the region has now hinted that it may support another Desert Storm against Iraq. On November 10, the Saudi newspaper, "Al-Bilad" wrote:
"Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is misinterpreting the stand taken by Arab countries which have stated several times that they oppose any action against the Iraqi people. (The Iraqi leadership) must understand that nobody can prevent a military strike on Iraq if such action is approved by the UN Security Council. Support for the Iraqi people does not mean Iraq will be able to escape its commitments to the UN and halt cooperation with arms inspectors. The ideal solution for the Iraqi regime to avoid another Desert Storm would be to accept totally the demands of the UN."
This mention by a major Saudi newspaper of another possible U.S. led invasion of Iraq through Saudi territory dramatically changes the equation in the current U.S.-Iraq standoff. During U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen's visit last week to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in search of support, Saudi's King Fahd reportedly rejected any use of Saudi airbases in the event of a military strike on Iraq. However, on November 6, NBC news reported that "despite a public statement from Saudi Arabia that it's soil would be off-limits in the event of further strikes on Iraq, privately the Saudis said that support operations (refueling, supply and maintenance operations) could be mounted from Prince Sultan Airbase." This report, likely generated by Cohen's entourage, was the first indication that there might be some flexibility in the Saudi position. The Al-Bilad story confirms the shift.

What is the driving force behind the Saudi change of heart? The answer is -- as in all Persian Gulf matters -- oil. A combination of factors, including the Asian economic crisis, has caused a glut in world oil supplies. The resulting decline in oil prices has severely damaged oil-dependent economies. Saudi Arabia has been doubly hurt by the price drop and the Asian economic collapse, as Saudi Aramco had bet heavily on Asia. Yet despite efforts by other OPEC members and even some non-OPEC countries to reduce global crude oil production, Iraqi production has continued and even gradually increased. Military action against Iraq would undoubtedly have one desirable effect. It would probably boost oil prices in the short run, and if sustained, could force Iraqi oil off the market. This prospect cannot but help please the Saudis.
The United States appears to have broken through the isolation we described last weekend. If Saudi Arabia is prepared to view a new Desert Storm with equanimity, the U.S. may have some real military options. Of course, the Saudi news report indicated that the use of Saudi territory is contingent on a vote of the UN Security Council approving military action. So far, the British, the U.S. have been alone in supporting some military action, while France and Russia have vehemently opposed this option.
However, things are changing there as well. On November 10, Agence France Presse cited French Foreign Ministry spokesman Francois Rivasseau as saying, "We are not ruling out any response. Military strikes are an option." This leaves Russia as essentially the only country completely opposed to the "military option" against Iraq. We think that it is extremely unlikely that Moscow will change its position.
The U.S. currently has about 13 warships in the Gulf, including a carrier air wing aboard the USS Eisenhower. This number should reach 25 within the next ten days, including the USS Enterprise Battle Group and another Marine Expeditionary Unit. This would mean that the U.S. would have an "afloat force" of 140 aircraft and the capability to launch 200-300 Tomahawk missiles.
Additionally, the U.S. has numerous aircraft stationed in Turkey and throughout the rest of the region. The U.S. also has 1,600 troops in Kuwait and 1,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, with equipment for another 6,000-9,000 troops pre-positioned in Kuwait and Qatar. This is enough for a series of hard air strikes against Iraq, but not for a sustained air campaign, and certainly not for offensive ground operations.
So far two options appear to be on the table. One is a limited strike against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) targets. The other would be a limited air campaign against a wider array of strategic targets, including valuable economic assets. The former strategy depends on U.S. intelligence sources. How confident is the United States that it knows the precise location of Iraqi NBC targets? The paradox of precision guided munitions is that the thing that makes them most valuable, precision, demands levels of intelligence that are frequently beyond the ability of intelligence services to deliver with extremely high levels of confidence. The ability to hit a given room in a building requires that you know what room to hit.
The other strategy would be a more sustained air campaign within the limits of available aircraft and logistical support. This sort of attack would go beyond NBC sites to attacks on command and control facilities or key industrial infrastructure, such as Iraq's power grid. The problem is that Saddam has faced these air strikes before. He can absorb the punishment or end it, simply by agreeing to allow inspectors in. In other words, Saddam has the ability to turn U.S. air strikes on and off, without actually making any substantial concessions. There is an interesting aspect on the ground. Saddam's forces appear to be deployed in defensive positions anticipating air attacks rather than ground attacks. A ground attack would catch them poorly deployed. But a ground attack would require substantially more time to mount and, most important, could lead to substantial casualties. Moreover, with commitments in the former Yugoslavia and Korea, this is not a time for an imbalanced commitment of ground forces. Interestingly, the U.S. shifted 18 A-10s to the region. These are primarily close air support weapons for armored and mechanized forces. Now, 18 are not enough to support a major ground offensive, but they would be very useful for limited engagements or to deter Iraqi ground attacks following air strikes. So, the U.S. is clearly thinking about the situation on the ground right now.The U.S. is in a paradoxical position. The political situation appears to be improving dramatically for the United States.
Apart from Russia, a coalition in favor of military operations appears to be developing both globally and regionally. The Russian opposition is not trivial, and while it will not effect Iraq here and now, it will have long term repercussions. The problem is that the military options that appear available are simply not substantial enough to deter Saddam. More important, if Saddam becomes concerned, a simple announcement accepting inspections will be sufficient to turn off the air strikes, even if Saddam later manipulates and reneges on his promise. This is the key problem. Even with political support and decisive military options, Saddam is in control of events. He can create crises. He can abort crises. The very geometry of the relationship is asymmetric. The U.S. cannot deliver a decisive blow against Saddam, nor can it disengage. This means that Saddam can control U.S. behavior. Increasing the political coalition's cohesiveness merely reemphasizes the military limitations on the U.S., as well as showing that, regardless of support, Saddam is in control of the situation.
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